Excellence in Scholarship and Learning
The Camp David Summit – What Went Wrong?
Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians Analyze the Failure of the Boldest Attempt Ever to Resolve the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict
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The first book to bring together American, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who participated in the summit, as well as experts who prepared the material for the negotiators and academics who specialize in the methodology of peace negotiations, to confront the different versions of what happened at Camp David.
Presents the full version of the controversial prime minister, Ehud Barak.
The Camp David Summit of 2000 was a formative
event in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian relations.
It was the most comprehensive effort ever to resolve a hundred-year
conflict. Yet, it not only ended in failure but was immediately
followed by the eruption of unprecedented violence.
After an message from President Bill Clinton, and introductory chapters by Shimon Shamir, Itamar Rabinovich, Sari Nusseibeh and Martin Indyk, the 27 chapter contributions are divided to: Israeli Negotiators, Palestinian Perspectives, American Participants, the Barak Version and its Critics, the Negotiation Experts, Academic Perspectives, and the Clinton Parameters. The volume concludes with a Political Debate on the way forward.
This book is essential reading for all those interested in Israeli–Arab relations, the Middle East in general, international diplomacy, and conflict resolution.
|Hardback Price:||£55.00 / $67.50|
|Release Date:||May 2005|
|Paperback Price:||£0.00 / $0.00|
|Release Date:||May 2005|
|Page Extent / Format:||272 pp. / 229 x 152 mm|
|Illustrated:||Eight-page colour map plates|
List of Maps
Greetings by JOHANNES
Message from PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON
SHIMON SHAMIR The Enigma of Camp David
ITAMAR RABINOVICH The Failure of Camp David: Four Different Narratives
SARI NUSSEIBEH There Could Have Been Another Way
MARTIN INDYK Camp David in the Context of US Peace Strategy
DANNY YATOM Background, Process and Failure
AMNON LIPKIN-SHAHAK The Roles of Barak, Arafat and Clinton
YOSSI GINOSSAR Factors That Impeded the Negotiations
GILEAD SHER Lessons from the Camp David Experience
MUNTHER S. DAJANI Wrong Assumptions
SAMIH AL-ABED The Israeli Proposals Were Not Serious
MOHAMMED S. DAJANI The "Blaming Game" Is Wrong
AARON DAVID MILLER The Effects of the "Syria First" Strategy
MARTIN INDYK Sins of Omission, Sins of Commission
ROBERT MALLEY American Mistakes and Israeli Misconceptions
The Barak Version
EHUD BARAK The Myths Spread About Camp David Are Baseless
RON PUNDIK The Lines of 1967 Should Have Been the Basis for Negotiations
SHAUL ARIELI The Strategy of Creating Facts on the Ground Impeded Negotiations
The Input of Experts
REUVEN MERHAV Planning for Jerusalem
MOHAMMED S. DAJANI The Role of Informal Talks
MENACHEM KLEIN Track II Plans
Y. BAR-SIMAN-TOV An Irresolvable Conflict or Lack of Ripeness?
ASHER SUSSER The "End of Conflict" Obstacle
ZEEV MAOZ The Pitfalls of Summit Diplomacy
PETER CARNEVALE Psychological Barriers to Negotiations
YULI TAMIR, YUVAL STEINITZ, DAN MERIDOR, YOSSI BEILIN
Past, Present and Future – A Political Debate
APPENDIX – The Clinton Parameters
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