History
Excellence in Scholarship and Learning
Excellence in Scholarship and Learning
The Cold War and Soviet Mistrust of Churchill’s Pursuit of Détente, 1951–1955
Uri Bar-Noi is Lecturer in the History Department of Bar-Ilan University, Israel. He is a former Research Fellow at Chaim Herzog Center for the Study of the Middle East and Diplomacy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. He has published articles on Moscow and the Curtailment of British Exports as Part of the American-led Embargo of Trade with the Communist bloc, 1951–4; Georgi Malenkov’s Leadership and the Post-Stalinist Power Struggle in the Soviet Union, 1953–5; and the Rapprochement between the USSR and Palestinian Guerilla Organization following the 1967 War.
The release of previously unavailable Soviet archives has allowed
a re-examination of Anglo-Soviet relations during Churchill’s
peacetime administration, with special emphasis on the Kremlin’s
motivation for resisting the Prime Minister’s attempts to
end the Cold War. Throughout 1951–55, the time was not yet
ripe for détente: the USSR and Western powers were less than
willing to accommodate each other. Instead they engaged in the consolidation
of their own blocs and the build-up of their defensive potential.
With Winston Churchill becoming the most outspoken advocate of détente,
the Kremlin greeted the return to power of the Conservative Party
under his leadership with a general mistrust.
After Josef Stalin’s death in March 1953, détente
remained a distant reality. The collective leadership was keen to
reduce international tensions without modifying its predecessor’s
foreign policy, or abandoning Soviet strongholds of central and
eastern Europe. As part of its peace offensive, the Kremlin was
prepared to improve the atmosphere in relations with Britain and
increase the volume of Anglo-Soviet trade. However, the British
remained mistrustful of the intentions of Stalin’s successors,
and refrained from initiatives leading to a relaxation of export
controls independent from American embargo policy.
The author demonstrates that Stalin’s heirs suspected
that Churchill’s pursuit of détente was designed to
secure far-reaching concessions. Moscow also felt that as a junior
partner acting in full dependence on and in cooperation with US
policy, Churchill was in no position to conciliate between the USSR
and the USA. Engaged in a domestic struggle for power, members of
the collective leadership were reluctant to allow their opponent,
Georgi Malenkov, to negotiate single-handedly with western statesmen.
It was only after Nikita Khrushchev’s ascendance to power
and Churchill’s resignation from office that the Kremlin was
prepared to participate in summit talks with the western heads of
government.
| Hardback ISBN: | 978-1-84519-176-4 |
| Hardback Price: | £55.00 / $67.50 |
| Release Date: | July 2007 |
| Page Extent / Format: | 1248 pp. / 229 x 152 mm |
| Illustrated: | No |
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction: Scholarly Debate on Churchill’s Postwar Diplomacy
1. The Cold War and East–West Pursuit for
Bargaining Strength in the Early 1950s
2. Churchill’s Return to ‘Number 10’ and
Soviet Distrust of his Initiative for Summit Talks, October
1951–January 1952
3. Soviet Peace Propaganda, Negotiations
of the EDC Treaty and British Plans for ‘Let and Live’ Arrangements
with Moscow, 1952
4. Stalemate in the Heart of Europe: Soviet
Notes on Germany and the Deadlock on the Austrian State Treaty
Negotiations, March–October 1952
5. A New Breeze from Russia: Conclusion of
the Stalinist Regime and Churchill’s Aspirations for Détente,
October 1952–April 1953
6. A Half-hearted Partnership for Peace:
Moscow’s Deficient Interest towards Churchill’s Proposal for
Summit Talks, May–July 1953
7. From Rapid Recuperation to Bitter Discontent:
Churchill’s Failure to Promote his Initiative for Top-Level
Talks, August–December 1953
8. Renewed Prospects: The Berlin Conference
and the Interest within the Kremlin in Informal Anglo-Soviet
Talks, January–March 1954
9. A Final Bid for Peace: The Far Eastern
Conference and the Soviet Coup de Grâce to Churchill, April–July
1954
10. Tragic End: Malenkov’s Downfall and Churchill’s
Resignation from Office, October 1954–April 1955
Conclusion: Soviet Resistance to Churchill’s Bid for Peace
Revisited Notes
Bibliography
Index
Although
there has been increasing scholarly attention to Winston Churchill’s
post-war statesmanship and pursuit of East–West détente
during his Premiership of 1951–1955, Bar-Noi argues that most
of it has focused on the limitations of his détente policy
and the causes for its failure and no attempt has been made to reassess
soviet responses to Churchill’s proposals in light of new
archival evidence from post-Soviet Russia. His study is intended
to address that gap. Its main argument is that neither the Soviets
nor the Americans were willing to seriously negotiate on contentious
issues prior to consolidating their military potential and improving
their bargaining positions relative to each other. On the Soviet
side, this attitude mainly reflected the fear of Stalin and his
successors of external aggression, which prompted them to prioritize
the avoidance of war, the preservation of the Soviet regime, and
the maintenance of hegemony in Eastern Europe as key diplomatic
aims.
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